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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Integration and the disunity of the social sciences.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C., Charbonneau, M., & Fogelman, J.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Nagatsu, M., & Ruzzene, A., editor(s),
Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social Science: A Dialogue. Bloomsbury, 2018.\n
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@incollection{Heintz2018integration,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe and Charbonneau, Mathieu and Fogelman, Jay},\n\ttitle = {Integration and the disunity of the social sciences},\n\tbooktitle = {Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social Science: A Dialogue},\n\tEditor = {Nagatsu, Michiru and Ruzzene, Attilia},\n\tpublisher = {Bloomsbury},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tkeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tAbstract = {We defend integrative pluralism: a view that recognises the utility of multiple approaches for understanding social phenomena, yet emphasizes the value of integrative research. Different fields of the social sciences rely on different methods and explanatory tools even when they study the very same phenomena. We illustrate this plurality of the social sciences with the studies of crowds. We show how three different takes on crowd phenomena (psychology, rational choice theory, and network theory) can complement one another. We conclude that social scientists are better described as researchers endowed with explanatory toolkits than specialists of some specific social domain. Social scientists' toolkits are adapted for identifying and specifying the role of specific causal factors among the multiple factors that produce social phenomena. These factors can be, in a non-exclusive way, economic incentives, psychological processes, the ecology or aspects of the social and cultural environment. The integrative research we advocate in this chapter are attempts to specify the role of such diverse causal factors.},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-Charbonneau-Fogelman-2018-integration.pdf}\n}\n\n\n
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\n We defend integrative pluralism: a view that recognises the utility of multiple approaches for understanding social phenomena, yet emphasizes the value of integrative research. Different fields of the social sciences rely on different methods and explanatory tools even when they study the very same phenomena. We illustrate this plurality of the social sciences with the studies of crowds. We show how three different takes on crowd phenomena (psychology, rational choice theory, and network theory) can complement one another. We conclude that social scientists are better described as researchers endowed with explanatory toolkits than specialists of some specific social domain. Social scientists' toolkits are adapted for identifying and specifying the role of specific causal factors among the multiple factors that produce social phenomena. These factors can be, in a non-exclusive way, economic incentives, psychological processes, the ecology or aspects of the social and cultural environment. The integrative research we advocate in this chapter are attempts to specify the role of such diverse causal factors.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Four misunderstandings about cultural attraction.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Scott-Phillips, T., Blancke, S., & Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n
Evolutionary Anthropology, 27(4): 162–173. 2018.\n
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@article{ScottPhillips2017misunderstandings,\n\tauthor = {Scott-Phillips, Thom and Blancke, Stefaan and Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {Four misunderstandings about cultural attraction},\n\tjournal={Evolutionary Anthropology},\n\tvolume={27},\n\tnumber={4},\n\tpages={162--173},\n\tyear={2018},\n\tpublisher={Wiley Online Library},\n\tdoi = {10.1002/evan.21716},\n\turl_pdf = {https://thomscottphillips.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/scott-phillips-et-al-2018-four-misunderstandings-about-cat.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tkeywords={cultural evolution},\n\tabstract={Cultural attraction theory (CAT) is a research agenda the purpose of which is to develop causal explanations of cultural phenomena. CAT is also an evolutionary approach to culture, in the sense that it treats culture as a population of items of different types, with the frequency of tokens of those types changing over time. Now more than 20 years old, CAT has made many positive contributions, theoretical and empirical, to the naturalization of the social sciences. In consequence of this growing impact, CAT has, in recent years, been the subject of critical discussion. Here, we review and respond to these critiques. In so doing, we also provide a clear and concise introduction to CAT. We give clear characterizations of CAT's key theoretical notions, and we outline how these notions are derived from consideration of the natural character of cultural phenomena (Box 1). This naturalistic quality distinguishes CAT from other evolutionary approaches to culture.}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Cultural attraction theory (CAT) is a research agenda the purpose of which is to develop causal explanations of cultural phenomena. CAT is also an evolutionary approach to culture, in the sense that it treats culture as a population of items of different types, with the frequency of tokens of those types changing over time. Now more than 20 years old, CAT has made many positive contributions, theoretical and empirical, to the naturalization of the social sciences. In consequence of this growing impact, CAT has, in recent years, been the subject of critical discussion. Here, we review and respond to these critiques. In so doing, we also provide a clear and concise introduction to CAT. We give clear characterizations of CAT's key theoretical notions, and we outline how these notions are derived from consideration of the natural character of cultural phenomena (Box 1). This naturalistic quality distinguishes CAT from other evolutionary approaches to culture.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Cultural attraction theory.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Callan, H., editor(s),
The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology. Wiley-Blackwell, 2018.\n
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@incollection{Heintz2017encyclopedia,\n\tauthor = {Heintz, Christophe},\n\ttitle = {Cultural attraction theory},\n\tEditor = {Callan, Hilary},\n\tdoi = {10.1002/9781118924396},\n\tbooktitle={The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz2017-preprint-CulturalAttractionTheory.pdf},\n\tyear = {2018},\n\tpublisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},\n\tkeywords = {cultural evolution},\n\tabstract={Cultural Attraction Theory (CAT), also referred to as cultural epidemiology, is an evolutionary theory of culture. It provides conceptual tools and a theoretical framework for explaining why and how ideas, practices, artifacts and other cultural items spread and persist in a community and its habitat. It states that cultural phenomena result from psychological or ecological factors of attraction.}\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n
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\n Cultural Attraction Theory (CAT), also referred to as cultural epidemiology, is an evolutionary theory of culture. It provides conceptual tools and a theoretical framework for explaining why and how ideas, practices, artifacts and other cultural items spread and persist in a community and its habitat. It states that cultural phenomena result from psychological or ecological factors of attraction.\n
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\n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n Updating evolutionary epistemology.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n Heintz, C.\n\n\n \n\n\n\n In Soetaert, R., Blancke, S., & Rutten, K., editor(s),
Perspectives on Science and Culture. Purdue University Press, 2018.\n
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@incollection{heintz2018updating,\n\ttitle={Updating evolutionary epistemology},\n\tauthor={Heintz, Christophe},\n\tAbstract={\n\tChristophe Heintz argues that evolutionary epistemology is a theoretical framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon. As spelled out by Campbell in the 70's, evolutionary epistemology has an ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between biological evolution, especially biological evolution of human cognition, and the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evolution of human cognition. In this chapter, the author considers Campbell's project and specify why it is still today a worthwhile project for explaining the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. But he also criticizes Campbell's evolutionary epistemology for assuming that blind variation and selective retention is the process through which science evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odd with much of what we know about scientific cognition and the history of science. He advocates: (1) dropping the methodological constraint of looking for processes of blind variation and selective retention at the expense of other constructive processes and mechanisms of knowledge production, but (2) retaining the integrative point of evolutionary epistemology, which implies taking seriously the results of evolutionary psychology and (3) retaining the populational framework for explaining the history of science, which means questioning why some scientific beliefs and practices eventually spread and stabilize in a scientific community. We end up with an updated research programme for evolutionary epistemology, which faces new challenges.},\n\tbooktitle={Perspectives on Science and Culture},\n\tEditor = {Soetaert, Ronald and Blancke, Stefaan and Rutten, Kris},\n\tyear={2018},\n\turl_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Heintz-2018-UpdatingEvolutionaryEpistemology.pdf},\n\tpublisher={Purdue University Press},\n\tkeywords={scientific cognition, cultural evolution}\n}\n\n\n\n
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\n Christophe Heintz argues that evolutionary epistemology is a theoretical framework for the study of science as a historical and cultural phenomenon. As spelled out by Campbell in the 70's, evolutionary epistemology has an ambitious goal: it aims at understanding the complex relations between biological evolution, especially biological evolution of human cognition, and the cultural evolution of scientific knowledge. It eventually aims at forming an integrated causal theory of the evolution of science, starting with the evolution of human cognition. In this chapter, the author considers Campbell's project and specify why it is still today a worthwhile project for explaining the evolution of science as a specific case of cultural evolution. But he also criticizes Campbell's evolutionary epistemology for assuming that blind variation and selective retention is the process through which science evolves. This assumption, the author argues, is at odd with much of what we know about scientific cognition and the history of science. He advocates: (1) dropping the methodological constraint of looking for processes of blind variation and selective retention at the expense of other constructive processes and mechanisms of knowledge production, but (2) retaining the integrative point of evolutionary epistemology, which implies taking seriously the results of evolutionary psychology and (3) retaining the populational framework for explaining the history of science, which means questioning why some scientific beliefs and practices eventually spread and stabilize in a scientific community. We end up with an updated research programme for evolutionary epistemology, which faces new challenges.\n
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